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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STEPHEN ADAMS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN LAMICQ and JEAN ARCUBY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 2126 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
In the above a.ction plaintiff is the appellant and ap-
peals from a judgment rendered in the above cause April 
18, 1947, and from rulings of the court during the proceed-
ings of said trial. 
STATE:MENT OF FACTS: 
Plaintiff, who is the appellant, filed in said court on 
March 5, 1945, his short form of complaint seeking to quiet 
title to the following described land in Duchesne County, 
Utah, as follows: 
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The North half of the Northeast quarter of Section 
33, Township 1 South, Range 2 West of the Uintah 
Special Meridian. 
To said complaint and respondents, defendants therein, 
:filed their answer claiming ti tie to said property by reason 
of: 
1. A valid tax title 
2. Adverse possession under color of title 
The court determined that the tax title was invalid. 
Plaintiff was the patentee of said ground and had never 
conveyed it to anyone. The court found that said land 
went to tax sale in 1925 and that auditor's tax deed was 
issued May 12, 1930, to Duchesne County. (Tr. 4) That 
in the summer of 19 3 7 County Commissioners of Duchesne 
County entered into an oral lease of said lands, together 
with a large tract of grazing lands to Eldon Brady as lessee, 
who used a part of said land for grazing of sheep from 
November, 1937, until April1938, but was not on said land 
aftersaidApril, 1938. (Tr. 11) Thaton0ctober4, 1938, 
the respondents herein leased a large tract of county ground 
which included the above described land that they grazed 
sheep on all of said lands from December until the :first 
day of April following. That on December 5, 1939, re-
spondents entered into a contract for the purchase of 
several thousand acres of land including the land herein in 
question, said contract being marked Exhibit A. That on 
March 1, 1944, Duchesne County executed a quit claim 
deed to the respondents·. (Tr. 4) That a part of -said land 
is chiefly brush, unimproved · and unreclaimed land, 
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although it is shown that approximately 3 5 acres used by 
appellant was at all times under irrigation and cultivation, 
and that none of such 3 5 acres was ever used by respondent. 
That respondent knew appellant was using it at all times. 
The court found that the tax proceedings were ir-
regular and the tax sale and deed thereon void. (Tr. 5) 
Said land lies adjacent to and apart of the farming 
area. That approximately 35 acres of said land are under 
canal and every year during the period herein in question, 
plaintiff cultivated, improved and harvested crops and held 
fenced said portion so farmed, being about 3 5 acres of the 
80 acres. That respondent did not attempt at any time 
to graze other than the brush land and made not protests of 
the use of said land for agricultural purposes and grazing 
by the appellant. That he, nor anyone for him, was not in 
the vicinity of said land from April 1st, until November 
of each year. That he did not cultivate, improve, irrigate, 
or fence or spend any money in the improv,ement or ir-
rigation of said land. That he never camped on said land or 
in any way asserted any rights other than occassionally 
grazing in winter. That he bought some hay from appellant 
and fed a little on a part of said ground. That the appellant 
raised crops every year on 3 5 acres of said land and that his 
possession was at all times exclusive in the use of said 3 5 
acres of land. That Eldon Brady rented for winter graz-
ing of his sheep a large tract of land in the Cedar View 
country and gave $100.00 for the use of the land. That 
he went on to the area the :first part of November and 
remained in that area until the first of April, 1938. That 
he did not use said land nor was on said land after that time. 
That the appellant wrote for a lease on the same gener-
alland and that on November 14, 1938, gave his check, 
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Exhibit 3, for $150.00, which check was paid December 
22, 1938. (Tr. 21). That each year thereafter he did bring 
his sheep from the summer range to that section in the fore-
part of November and stay until the first of April. That 
no one made any protests to the appellant of his use of said 
ground and that they did not any of them attempt to use 
any of the ground under cultivation, except the appellant. 
That Brady purposely (Tr. 11) avoided it and likewise 
(Tr. 29) LaMicq knew Adams was using said cultivated 
land. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: 
Appellant presents. three separate assignments of error: 
1. That the court erred in admission and exclusion of 
evidence during the trial of said cause. 
2. That the court erred in its :findings of fact and con-
clusions of law in finding that sufficient adverse possession 
had been had to constitute adverse possession under the laws 
of this state. 
3. That the court erred in rendering judgment quiet-
ing title to said property in the defendants, respondents 
herein, and against the plaintiff, appellant herein. 
A. For arid grazing area, being the uninclosed brush 
lands. 
B. For cultivated area. 
C. That 3 5 a.cres of said ground is definitely irrigated 
agricultural crop producing ground under an in-
closure and that no adverse possession was had 
or asserted of any portion thereof, in any manner. 
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ARGUMENTS: 
Assignment of Error No. 1 directed to alleged error 
in ruling of the court, which rulings were excepted to at the· . 
trial: 
Exhibit A being the purported agreement dated De-
cember 5, 1939, was presented and identified by Porter 
Merrell. It is shown at Page 15 of the T r. to have .contained 
other entries in which Mr. Merrell testified as follows: 
A. ((These entries have to do with the equity tax that 
has been added to the property for 1942, 1943, as . 
well as 1941." 
On T r. 16 he testified: 
Q. ((Then these entries that were made since the date 
of the contract have been placed there since it was 
signed, if at all?'' 
A. ((Yes." 
The admission of such a contract unsigned changed by 
various entries covering a period of three years or four 
were received without excluding anything therefrom. Its 
admission constituted prejudicial error. . . 
Tr. 19 referring to minute entries of County Com-
missioners, counsel asked respondent, who was not present; 
and not a county commissioner: 
Q. ((And you have heard the minute which I just 
read into the record, which exhibit has not yet been 
admitted. You made application to lease certain 
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county ground. Can you tell us what county 
ground is referred to in this matter." 
It was objected to and the court sustained the objection, 
then Mr Jensen said: 
"lt is the only way I can do it. I can call back 
Mr. Young." 
The court: 
uuncertain and ambiguous, consequently parole 
evidence can be heard to explain it. It is over-
ruled." 
Q. uwhat is the ground?" 
A. uNorth and West of Roosevelt, Cedar View, and 
all that I ·got under the contract now, all that I 
bought." 
Q. uAll that was subsequently conveyed to you in the 
deed and referred to in the contract, which are at-
tached and made a part of your answer in this law 
suit?" 
Objection on the ground that it was incompetent. 
The court: 
Tr. ult is overruled ... He may answer." 
It is. the contention of the appellant that such ques-
tions and answers were definitely incompetent. The minutes 
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of County Commissioners showing that a letter was writt,en 
asking for lease when the respondent apparently was not 
present and that an answer was made to his letter, to· 
permit him to state what was included and intended to be 
included in a minute entirely by a Board of County Com-
missioners, when he was personally not present or to inter-
pret the meaning of the minutes, did not lie within his right 
as a witness, and it is the contention of appellant that the 
admission of the same constituted error. 
On page Tr. 2a LaMicq upon cross-examination was 
asked by counsel for appellant: 
Q. c:c:Do you know whether Mr. Adams was in posses-
sion of this land and cultivated it during all of that 
summer of 1939?" 
Objection: 
c:c:I object to that as calling for a ·COnclusion on a 
legal matter whether he was in possession or not." 
The court: 
c:c:I think that is well taken." 
The defendant was under cross-examination. He had 
testified as to his possession and use of all the lands. The 
question was directed to a matter of common experience as 
to cultivation by appellant and in possession for that pur-
pose it was not directed and cannot reasonably be inter-
preted to have been directed to the matter of what con-
stituted legal possession. The relative items of possession, 
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the manner and time of use are all items of possession and 
the court may determine therefrom whether or not such 
possession constituted the legal possession required by law. 
The exclusion was error. 
Assignment No. 2 is: ((That the court erred in its find-
ings of fact and ·Conclusions of law in finding that sufficient 
adverse possession had been had to constitute adverse pos-
session under the laws of this state." In presenting respond-
ents cross-complaint and answer based upon adverse pos-
session, attempt was made to tie into the period of adverse 
possession use by one Eldon Brady and the only testimony 
given by him is as follows: Tr. Page 9: 
Q. ul will ask you whether or not you made an offer 
to Duchesne County to lease the land which lay in 
the Cedar View country, which Mr. Young has 
mentioned in his testimony?" 
A. ul did." 
Q.. uWhat offer did you make?" 
A. HI off.ered Porter Merrell $100.00 for the use of 
land per year." (Tr. 10) 
Tr. Page 11: 
Q. ((What stock did you run there?" 
A. ul ran sheep there." 
Q. uWhich was probably the forepart of November?" 
A. uUntil the first of April, spring of 1938." 
Tr. Page 12: 
Q. uls there any physical thing on it that would cause 
you to remember that land?'' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
A. uwell, I herd my sheep from the North line of this 
.80 acres which was a :field I didn't want them to 
get into." 
There isn't anything in the testimony of Mr. Brady 
that would show what lands were leased; that he used any 
exclusive possession, but the contrary is shown definitely 
as to the :field under cultivation wherein he indicated that 
he didn't want his sheep to get onto that property. 
Brady's use, if at all, was not of cultivated area, and 
was not exclusive, and did not tie in with any claimed pos-
session of respondent. There elapsed not less than seven 
months between any use between time Brady left the area 
and time respondents came into that vicinity. All of this 
time appellant used, cultivated and had fenced 3 5 acres 
of Adams' tract. Balance was open, arid territory open 
to use of anyone. 
That there is no privity between Brady and respond-
ents and that there was no continuity of any attempted 
possession however meager from that time Brady left in 
April until LaMicq paid for the lease in November. It is 
essential to find that open, exclusive, uninterrupted pos-
session was ha~ during all of this period and that privity 
existed to make up the required adverse period. 
For the grazing season following, (Exhibit 4) , (T r. 
22), appellant sent check for $100.00 dated o·ctober 28, 
19 3 9, paid November 16, 19 3 9, for another rental period. 
That the balance of said grazing season was paid April 6, 
1939, by check which was paid April 20, 1939. That the 
minutes of the County Commissioners (Tr. 18) show that 
the original lease was not to take effect until the rental 
was paid. This fact would further extend the period that 
any of said portion of land was not under even a contract 
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of lease and would further amplify that possession was not 
exclusive and uninterrupted. 
Section 104-2-9, UCA 1943, cla8si:fies and defines what 
constitutes adverse possession in which section it provides 
for cultivation. Section 104-2-7, UCA 1943, is a legal 
presumption in favor of the owner. 104-2-12, UCA 1943, 
provides specifically that possession must be continuous. 
Buswell on Adverse Possession, Section 269, Page 271, 
provides: 
((Where there is a mixed possession under color 
of title or a possession at the same time of more than 
one, claiming under a separate colorable title, the 
seisin of the estate is in him who has the better title 
for all cannot be seised. The possession follows the 
title. In other words, although there may be con-
current possession, there cannot be concurrent 
seisin of land; and only one being seised, the posses-
sion must be in him because he has the best right." 
Hall vs. Powell, 4 S. E.R., Page 465: 
uThere would appear to be no cleare,r principal 
of reason and justice than this: That if the· right-
ful owner is in the actual occupancy of a part of his 
tract by himself or tenant, he is in the constructive 
and legal possession and seisin of the whole, unless 
he is disseised by a,ctual occupation and dispossession. 
If this were, not the law. the possession by wrong 
would be more favored than the rightful possession. 
In this kind of mixed constructive possession the 
legal seisin is according to the title. Title draws pos-
session to the owner. It remains until he is dispos-
sessed and then no further than actual dispossession 
by a trespasser who cannot acquire a constructive 
possession, which always remain with the legal title." 
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Buswell on Adverse Possession on Page 373: 
ui t was thus held that claiming under a deed 
of flats and the occasional passing over them would 
not be considered in law an ouster, but it must in-
clude en try and ouster." 
Abel vs. Love, 143 N.E. 515: 
uThe doctrine of adverse possession is to be 
taken strictly; there are no equities in favor of a 
person who seeks to acquire the property of another 
by adverse holding, and his acts are to be· strictly 
construed." 
Nelson vs. Johnson, 226 S.W. 94: 
((There can be no adverse possession without 
intent to claim title coincidental with the possession 
and to make the possession adverse, hostile, and ex-
clusive." 
Superior Oil Corporation vs. Alcorn, 47 S.W. Zd, 973: 
ttlt has been stated that a person has no posses-
sion whatever where he has neither clearing, in-
closure, nor a well-marked line surrounding the 
property." 
2 C.J.S. 544: 
uordinarily, the use of land merely for pastur-
age does not constitute adverse possession, especially 
where the use is only oc.casional, claimant uses no 
means to restrain the livestock to any particular 
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land, the land is not inclosed, and the stock of other 
persons also graze on the land; and even though 
there are other acts besides the· grazing of livestock, 
adverse possession is not made out where the other 
acts are only occasional or lack the requisite con-
tinuity or where they are not proved to have been 
performed on the land in controversy. The use of 
land for grazing purposes and the payment of taxes 
are insufficient." 
2 C.J.S. 550: 
uThere can be no adverse possession of wild 
land without actual possession. Apart from statute, 
land is not susceptible of adverse possession while it 
remains completely in a state of nature; a·cts of 
ownership, changing to a substantial extent the con-
dition of the land from a wild to an inclosed or cul-
tivated stat~e, are essential. Intermittent, trivial, 
and destructive acts are insufficient, especially 
where like acts are committed by the public gener-
ally with equal freedom. Particular matters held 
insufficient include sporadic entries, hunting and 
trapping, the cutting of hay, and the grazing or 
pasturing of cattle." 
Jeffers vs. Johnson, 175 S.W. 581: 
uOne or two possessory acts performed on wild 
land are insufficient to acquire title by adverse pos-
session." 
2 C.J.S. 551-Hole v. Rittenhouse, 37 Pa. 116: 
eel£ the lanc;l is woodland, there must be some 
act of actual possession of such .character as will be 
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sufficient under well-known rules to acquire title. 
There must ordinarily be such a continuous and per-
sistent cutting of timber or wood from the tract as 
to be evidence of a claim of ownership or there must 
be some other continuous acts of adverse possession. 
In some jurisdictions actual possession of. woodland 
means residence on, or cultivation of, a part of the 
tract to which the woodland belongs, accompanied 
by designation of boundaries and the ordinary use of 
the woodland." 
2 C.J.S. 556-Foulke v. Bond, 41 N.J. Law 527: 
uunless the true owner has actual knowledge 
of hostile claim, it is essential to the acquisition of 
title by prescription or adverse possession that the 
possession be open, visible, public, and notorious. 
The foregoing rule is applicable not only where the 
adverse claimant is without color of title but also 
where such claimant has color of title." 
2 C.J.S. 557-Lasley vs. Kniskern, 115 N.W. 971: 
uWhile it is not required that the occupation 
be such as to inform a passing stranger that some 
one is asserting title, possession is not sufficiently 
open when neither the original owner nor a stranger 
passing over the land can see any indication of pos-
session." 
2 C.J.S. 558-McKay vs. Bullar, 178 S.E. 95: 
uTo be notorious, possession must be so con-
spicuous that it is generally known and talked of by 
the public or at least by the people in the vicinity of 
the premises. The possession must be as notorious as 
the nature of the land will permit. 
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verse possession that the true owner shall have 
knowledge or notice, actual or constructive, that 
the possession is hostile or adverse." 
2 C.J.S. 559-Murray vs. Bousquet, 280 P. 935: 
uThe element of notice is important where title 
by adverse possession is asserted to land located in a 
country which is wild, brok~en, mountainous, and 
very sparsely settled, and a small portion of which 
might be taken and held for years without anyone 
knowing whether or not there was a trespass." 
2 C.J.S. 561-ln reSt. Louis Register Title, 147 N.W. 
655: 
uln order that possession may constitute con-
structive notioe of an adverse claim, physical acts 
must be performed on the land and they must be of 
such character, and so definite and observable, as 
reasonable to indicate to the owner, should he visit 
th~e premises, that a claim of ownership adverse to 
his· is being asserted, or at least the circumstances 
must be such as to put a man of ordinary prudence 
on inquiry or notice and not mislead the owner into 
reasonably supposing that a mere trespass has been 
or is being committed." 
2 C.J.S. 562-DuMez vs. Dykstra, 241 N.W. 182: 
ccWhile use· alone may give notice of an ad-
verse claim of inclosed premises, it raises no pre-
sumption of hostility in the use of wild lands. This 
distinction is in the recognition of the general cus-
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tom of owners of wild lands to permit the public 
to pass over them without hindrance." 
2C.J.S. 563-Walkervs.Maynard, 31 S.W.(2d) 168: 
uThe mere running of stock on open range is 
insufficient notice of an adverse claim." 
2 C.J.S. 563-Trager vs. Elliot, 187 P. 875: 
uThe grazing of cattle on unoccupied prairie 
land is insufficient to charge the owner with notice 
of an adverse claim where the cattle of other persons 
also graze over the same land." 
2 C.J.S. 566-Fiorella vs. Jones (Mo.) 259 S.W. 782: 
uTo be effective as a means of acquiring title, 
the possession of an adverse claimant must be ex-
clusive of the true owner. The owner must be 
wholly excluded from possession by claimant." 
D.H. Perry vs. Ford, 46 Utah, Page 453, 151 P. 59: 
uThe chief ground on which a disseisor acquires 
title be adverse possession is laches of the owner, his 
seeing his boundary and land invaded by an adverse 
claimant asserting title, and himself remaining pas-
sive and acquiescing in such adverse claim and as-
sertion. Hence the general rule that the possession 
of an adverse claimant must be continuous, ex-
clusive, open, hostile, notorious, and of such char-
acter as to enable the owner to know of the invasion 
of his rights." 
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Jenkins v. Morgan, 196 P.2d, Page 873: 
((The only evidence of any possession of the 
land consists of the use by the defendants of the 
land for grazing of their cattle. How,ever, this use 
was not ·exclusive. One O·kelberry also used the 
lands in dispute for the grazing of his cattle during 
the years in question. Defendants admit ,knowl-
edge of Okelberry's use of the land without inter-
vention or complaint on their part. It" would thus 
appear that defendants have failed to establish oc-
cupation or possession within the limits of the stat-
utory requir~ments." 
Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. Dudley, 141 P.2d 
160, Page 168: 
uThere must be privity between persons suc-
cessively holding adversely in order to tack the pos-
session of a predecessor in possession to that of his 
successor. " 
The second and third assignments of error deal then 
with advers,e possession. The record disclosed that near the 
farming area where appellant resides is a large area of un-
reclaimed arid land. That a part of the land involved is 
uninclosed area. That the respondent is engaged in sheep 
culture and runs his herds in Colorado during the summer 
months and that he has wintered during the: time involved 
herein in the vicinity of these arid lands near Cedar View. 
The use of sheep in this manner is such that sheep were 
grazed for a small time ove·r an area, a part of which may 
have gotten on to the uninclos.ed part of the Adams land, 
but that it was in the winter time and only infrequent 
occasions did this occur. 
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The records show that a part of this land was under 
the canal and such was inclosed and farmed at all times 
by Mr. Adams whose house was near by. That he took the 
crops, utilized the land, applied irrigation water to this 3 5 
acres without interruption, without exclusion, and with-
out protest. 
The record is undisputable that no one was in posses-
sion of this land claimed under or through respondents, or 
ever appeared on the land for all of the late spring, summer 
and fall, which would be more than half of the entire· year 
and the period when livestock in that vicinity, including 
those of the plaintiff, had unrestricted use of this arid 
country and that the appellant had exclusive use, at all 
times and every year, of the 3 5 acres that were cultivated. 
The appellant established his record title to the prop-
erty. He established his continuous, uninterrupted use to 
the 35 acre tract. The burden of proof unde·r respondents 
counter-claim to have acquired title by the continuous and 
adverse use could not effect the area so held by the appellant 
even if the court should determine that continuous, un-
interrupted and adverse possession should be held of the 
other area, which is the part not under the fence or canal 
and not cultivated. Failure to establish adverse possession 
should cause the court to hold definitely that there had 
been no adverse possession on the cultivated area. It is, 
likewise, appellant's contention that the facts do not dis-
close that continuous, uninterrupted possession that is re-
quired by law to establish adverse rights that will ripen into 
tide was ever exercised h·y respondent. The court under 
its equity powers, if it felt that adversity existed in the arid 
section, might have so found and appointed a commis-
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sioner to dete·rmine and render de:fini te the boundaries of 
the area under the canal and farmed by appellant. 
The maximum of law that speaks down through all of 
the history of this class of cases on Adverse Possession re-
quires: ((That he set up the flag of conquest." 
CO·NCLUSIONS: 
It is the contention of the appellant: 
1. That he was the record owner at all times of said 
property and had not parted with such title. 
2. That the court erred in its exclusion of the testi-
mony on cross-examination of Mr. LaMicq concerning pos-
session of appellant. 
3. That respondents' possession has not been adverse, 
exclusive, and uninterrupted. 
4. That a pe·riod of time elapsed aggregating seven 
months between the time Brady left said property and any 
attempt of the respondents to go upon said land at all, which 
would be fatal. 
5. That no adverse possession of the arid ground has 
been had as required by law. 
6. That the appellant, plaintiff herein, has con-
tinuously, uninterruptedly, and exclusively and openly at 
all times held the· 3 5 acre farming area and that no adverse 
possession of any part of it has ever been had. 
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We, THEREFORE, submit that the decision of the 
trial court should be overruled and that t~tle to the property 
should be quieted in the plaintiff, who is the appellant 
herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
1>15~~AN»~DILLMAN !J...~C.cx:JU~ 
By ~W'£. Dillman 
Atto6teys for Appellant _ 
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